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GROUP INSOLVENCY—CHOICE OF FORUM 
AND LAW: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ENGLISH 
PRAGMATISM 
Gabriel Moss QC* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
hen the first humans came down from the trees and stood up 
straight, they operated in groups—usually closely knit family 
groups of persons related to each other. As with humans, so with artifi-
cial legal persons. Since business is done in groups of related entities, so 
rescue and restructuring, bankruptcy, and liquidations need to take place 
in the same groups. 
Although the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings,1 the European 
statute which applies generally on this subject, looks like a relatively re-
cent document, it is in substance the text of the failed convention on the 
same subject which had been negotiated for many years prior to its fail-
ure to come into effect in 1996.2 Thus the text and the concepts of the EC 
Regulation were already long out of date at the time that the EC Regula-
tion, containing a very similar text to that in the failed 1996 convention, 
came into force on May 31, 2002.3 
The other important background point is that in Europe, not only the 
continental but also the U.K.-type systems of law,4 generally enforce a 
strict separation between different legal entities and deal with each entity 
                                                                                                                                  
 *  Queen’s Council, England; B.A. in Jurisprudence, Oxford University; B.C.L. 
(Eldon Scholarship), Oxford University. The author is a Bencher (member of governing 
body) of Lincoln’s Inn, and is also authorized to sit as a deputy High Court judge in the 
Chancery Division. 
 1. Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). The text can be found 
with a commentary in GABRIEL S. MOSS ET AL., THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY 
PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATED GUIDE (2002). Although the body of the 
statute has not changed, the annexes, which, among other things, list the types of pro-
ceedings and the types of liquidators covered, have been updated from time to time to 
deal with the expansion of the number of countries affected (now twenty-six, i.e., the 
twenty-seven E.U. countries excepting Denmark) and changes in domestic procedures in 
the various countries covered. 
 2. The EC Regulation’s history is set out by Professor Fletcher in Chapter 1 of MOSS 
ET AL., supra note 1. 
 3. Council Regulation 1346/2000, art. 47, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). 
 4. See Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.), and the many cases which 
have followed it in over 100 years. 
W
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separately, especially in the context of insolvency proceedings.5 There 
are exceptions, and the United Kingdom, for example, in exceptional 
circumstances, allows substantive consolidation of estates.6 
The negotiators of the original Convention on Insolvency Proceedings 
(Convention) were aware that no provision whatsoever was being made 
for groups as such. Thus paragraph 76 of the Virgos-Schmit Report on 
the Convention states: 
The Convention offers no rule for groups of affiliated companies (par-
ent-subsidiary schemes). 
The general rule to open or to consolidate insolvency proceedings 
against any of the related companies as a principal or jointly liable 
debtor is that jurisdiction must exist according to the Convention for 
each of the concerned debtors with a separate legal entity. 
Naturally, the drawing up of a European norm on associated companies 
may affect this answer.7 
There was thus an awareness of a problem in relation to groups but any 
solution was put off to another day. There is no sign that the European 
Legislature is about to discuss groups, but the author knows that 
UNCITRAL has started work on the subject. 
By the time the EC Regulation came into force, the nature of trading in 
groups had changed further in that some groups operated their businesses 
in terms of “divisions” which cut across different corporate personalities. 
A system which ignored these commercial realities was bound to set up 
difficult tensions and conflicts. 
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW UNDER 
THE EC REGULATION 
The EC Regulation applies to all companies whose “centre of main in-
terests” is located within the European Union8 (except Denmark9—this 
exception is hereafter assumed rather than restated). This is irrespective 
                                                                                                                                  
 5. Polly Peck Int’l Fin., Ltd. v. Polly Peck Int’l Plc. (Re Polly Peck Int’l Plc.), (1996) 
2 All E.R. 433 (Ch) (Eng.), [1996] B.C.C. 486, 495. 
 6. Re Bank of Credit and Commerce Int’l SA (No. 2), [1992] B.C.C. 715 (CA Civ. 
Div.) 
 7. The Report, which never acquired official status as a result of the failure of the 
Convention, but which has been cited extensively to explain the EC Regulation, appears 
as Appendix 2 in MOSS, supra note 1. 
 8. The European Union now consists of twenty-seven countries, Bulgaria and Ro-
mania having joined on January 1, 2007. Dan Bilefsky, Romania and Bulgaria Celebrate 
Entry into European Union, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2. 2007. 
 9. Council Regulation 1346/2000, Recital (33), 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). 
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of the place of registration of the company.10 The rule of allocation be-
tween European Union (E.U.) Member States is that jurisdiction to open 
main proceedings is in the Member State where the center of main inter-
ests of the company within the European Union is located.11 Jurisdiction 
to open secondary proceedings is found in any Member State where there 
is “establishment” of the corporate entity.12 
There is no definition of “centre of main interests” in the text of the 
Regulation itself, but there is in the Recitals a sentence which has since, 
rather inaccurately, been referred to as a “definition.” This is contained 
in the text of Recital (13): “The ‘centre of main interests’ should corre-
spond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his 
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third par-
ties.”13 
As a definition this is both brief and rather vague, and is in fact not in-
tended to be a definition but rather a concise description. The words used 
are copied from the first subparagraph of paragraph 75 of the Virgos-
Schmit Report.14 What happened was that since the Convention never 
took effect, the Virgos-Schmit Report never acquired official status. 
However, the Community legislator, in order to help people understand 
the EC Regulation, took some phrases from the Virgos-Schmit Report, 
such as the one above, for explanatory effect. 
However, to take the introductory subparagraph of paragraph 75 of the 
Virgos-Schmit Report as a definition is plainly wrong.15 The rest of 
                                                                                                                                  
 10. In re BRAC Rent-A-Car Int’l, Inc., [2003] EWHC (Ch) 128, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 
1421 (Eng.). 
 11. Since some Member States, such as the United Kingdom, are themselves multi-
jurisdictional states, it is important to note that the EC Regulation provides no rule for the 
allocation of jurisdiction between the different legal jurisdictions inside the Member 
State. Thus if, for example, jurisdiction in a particular case is allocated to the United 
Kingdom because the center of main interests is there, the question of which country 
within the United Kingdom has jurisdiction to open the proceedings, i.e., England and 
Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland, is a matter of U.K. law rather than European com-
munity law. 
 12. The author is ignoring for present purposes the ability in some situations to open 
independent territorial proceedings prior to the opening of main proceedings in the center 
of main interests. 
 13. Council Regulation 1346/2000, Recital (13), 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). 
 14. MOSS ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2. 
 15. The European Court of Justice, in Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., 2006 
E.C.R. I-3813, at paragraph 33, uses the word “definition” in relation to Recital (13), but 
in the context this is simply the equivalent of “[t]he scope of that concept is highlighted” 
in paragraph 32. On this basis, Registrar Jaques in Stojecvic v. Komercni Banka A.S. (De-
cember 20, 2006) rejected the submission that Recital (13) contained a definition. Id. at 
para. 31 (unreported; text of judgment on file with author). 
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paragraph 75 goes on to explain the “centre of main interests” concept in 
more detail and is the nearest thing we have to an authoritative explana-
tion of what was intended by the concept. The final sub-paragraph of 
paragraph 75 states that “[w]here companies and legal persons are con-
cerned, the Convention presumes, unless proved to the contrary, that the 
debtor’s centre of main interests is the place of his registered office. This 
place normally corresponds to the debtor’s head office.”16 
To understand the import of this statement, one has to recall that do-
mestic law in Europe has two different approaches. In the United King-
dom, for example, the historic approach was based on the place of regis-
tration. According to this approach, if there were to be proceedings in 
more than one country, the main proceedings would take place in the 
jurisdiction of the place of registration, and proceedings in other jurisdic-
tions would be ancillary to the main proceeding.17 
In Europe (excluding Scandinavia), on the other hand, the approach 
was to focus on the “seat” of the company,18 which is most likely the 
idea behind the “centre of main interests” concept. Article 3 of the EC 
Regulation, which lays down the rules of allocation for opening main and 
secondary proceedings, is in reality a compromise between the two ap-
proaches. Although in substance the “seat” approach has won, Article 3 
of the EC Regulation takes on the appearance of a compromise by using 
a new concept—“centre of main interests”—and introducing a presump-
tion, rebuttable by appropriate evidence, that the “centre of main inter-
ests” is in the place of registration.19 Finally, the last subparagraph of 
paragraph 75 of the Virgos-Schmit Report tactfully glosses over the con-
flict and simply points out that the registered office is normally the 
debtor’s “head office.”20 
III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 
From a practical point of view, having separate main proceedings in 
each place where each subsidiary in a group is registered is wasteful, du-
plicative, expensive, and likely to impede a rescue, reconstruction, or 
beneficial realization of the business of the group. In theory, in a large 
group spread over the European Union, one can have twenty-seven21 or 
                                                                                                                                  
 16. MOSS ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2 at 282. 
 17. In re English Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank, [1893] 3 Ch. 385, 394 
(U.K.). 
 18. See MOSS ET AL., supra note 1, at para. 3.11. 
 19. Council Regulation 1346/2000, art. 3(1), 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). 
 20. MOSS ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2 at 282. 
 21. Note that the EC Regulation only applies in twenty-six out of the twenty-seven 
countries, Denmark being excluded. 
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more different main proceedings governed by different systems of law 
with different “liquidators” (a term which is defined in the EC Regula-
tion to include, among others, administrators)22 operating under twenty-
seven different systems of law,23 answerable to twenty-seven different 
courts and speaking (not quite) twenty-seven different languages.24 It is 
difficult to see how any sensible rescue, reconstruction, or beneficial sale 
can take place in such a situation. If in fact the group trades in “divi-
sions,” cutting across different legal entities, the position becomes even 
more difficult. 
A number of the group cases which have arisen of course have a strong 
U.S. connection. There is often an ultimate parent in the United States 
and there may well be a European subgroup centered on the United 
Kingdom. The business may nowadays be global and the places of incor-
poration may well not correspond to the place where business is actually 
conducted. 
IV. THE ENGLISH CASE LAW EXPERIENCE 
In a purely domestic context in England, the normal practice would be 
for the same persons to be appointed as, say, administrators to each com-
pany in a group of companies in financial trouble. This made the coordi-
nation of a rescue, reconstruction, or beneficial sale relatively easy com-
pared to each proceeding being led by a different person from a different 
organization.25 The advent of the EC Regulation meant that in appropri-
ate cases, a similar pragmatic approach could be taken in relation to for-
eign-registered subsidiaries. 
                                                                                                                                  
 22. Council Regulation 1346/2000, art. 2(b), 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). See also the 
list, in Annex C to the EC Regulation, referred to by Article 2(b). The list has been up-
dated from time to time. See supra, note 1. 
 23. In practice, an underestimate, since the United Kingdom itself (which for this 
purpose excludes small offshore islands such as the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man 
but includes Gibraltar) have four legal systems, i.e., England and Wales, Scotland, North-
ern Ireland, and Gibraltar, and there are material differences in insolvency law and pro-
cedure between them. 
 24. The language situation is complicated. Some countries, e.g., Germany and Aus-
tria, share the same language, but others have more than one official language, e.g., Bel-
gium (French and Flemish), Finland (Swedish as well as Finnish), Ireland (Irish and Eng-
lish), and the United Kingdom (where Welsh is an official language within Wales). 
 25. English courts are relatively relaxed about the potential conflicts of interest and 
expect liquidators and others to work out ways of dealing with them as and when they 
arise. Re Esal (Commodities) Ltd., (1988) 4 B.C.C. 475 (CA Civ. Div.). 
1010 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
A. Enron Directo SA, Lightman J., July 4, 2002 
The first opportunity arose in the case of Enron Directo Sociedad Limi-
tada (Enron Directo), a Spanish-incorporated Enron European company 
trading in Spain on a daily basis but whose headquarters’ functions were 
carried out from European group headquarters in London. The judge ac-
cepted the argument that the center of main interests of this Spanish-
registered company was in the United Kingdom and made an administra-
tion order as a main proceeding within the EC Regulation.26 The other 
relevant European Enron companies incorporated in England were al-
ready in administration.27 Thus the insolvency administration of Enron 
Directo could be run in the context of the insolvency administration of 
the group by the same administrators. Since, under Article 4 of the EC 
Regulation, English law applied to the proceedings in Enron Directo,28 
there was no question of consolidating either assets or liabilities with any 
other company, since English law does not permit this, save in very ex-
ceptional and rare cases.29 
B. Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd. (Re Daisytek)30 
Re Daisytek was the case which really stirred things up in Continental 
Europe. Assisted by the successful written argument in the Enron Di-
recto case, the judge in Re Daisytek made administration orders as main 
proceedings, not only for English companies in the European subgroup, 
but also for French- and German-registered companies.31 This was again 
on the basis that whilst current operations may have been going on in 
France and Germany, the head-office functions were carried out in Eng-
land.32 
As sometimes happens in England, the administration order appeared 
immediately but the judgment setting out the detailed reasons appeared 
some time later. To the author’s understanding, this is wholly unknown 
in Continental Europe, where what in England are called the “order” and 
                                                                                                                                  
 26. There is, unfortunately, no judgment, but the written argument  
accepted by the judge can be found on the Web site of the International  
Insolvency Institute. Skeleton Argument on Behalf of the Petitioner, In re  
Enron Directo Sociedad Limitada, High Court (Chancery), available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european_union/Enron_Directo_Skel.pdf. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Council Regulation 1346/2000, art. 4, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC). 
 29. Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No. 2), [1992] B.C.C. 715 
(CA). 
 30. [2003] B.C.C. 562 (Ch). 
 31. Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562 (Ch). 
 32. Id. 
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“judgment” are always in the same document. It thus created an unfortu-
nate impression when the order was presented, without the reasoned 
judgment (which was not yet written), to the French and German courts, 
and they were told that they were required to recognize the orders auto-
matically and without enquiry pursuant to Article 16 and subsequent arti-
cles of the EC Regulation.33 
The other difficulty at the time was that under Continental European 
systems such as those of France and Germany, directors have a statutory 
obligation to file a proceeding in court within a short period of obtaining 
knowledge of the insolvency of their company or face civil and criminal 
sanctions.34 It was not clear at the time of Re Daisytek whether a filing in 
respect of a French or German company in England would be sufficient 
compliance with this obligation. 
In France, the director who had himself caused the English filings 
made a separate filing, to protect his personal position, with a local 
commercial court.35 This needed to be on notice to the public prosecutor, 
who takes part in the hearing.36 One also must remember here that com-
mercial court judges in France are not professional judges or even legally 
qualified, although they do have legal assistance. The French court could 
not believe that the English court had really intended to put a French-
registered company into administration in England and considered that 
the English court must have confused the separate French entity with a 
branch of the English parent.37 The French court thus considered the 
English administration order to be void and made a French administra-
tion order.38 
Under the French system, the English administrators could apply to set 
aside this order and, as one would expect, did so, but failed to have it set 
aside.39 They did, however, appeal successfully to the Court of Appeal in 
Versailles.40 Importantly, by this stage, the reasoned judgment from Eng-
land was available and the Court of Appeal in Versailles could see that 
                                                                                                                                  
 33. Translations of the French and German first-instance judgments are on file with 
the author. See also the Versailles Court of Appeal judgment, by which stage the rea-
soned judgment of the English court was available. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of 
appeal] Versailles, Sept. 4, 2003, [2003] B.C.C. 984 (Fr.) (Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SA). 
 34. See, e.g., Skeleton Argument on Behalf of the Petitioner, In re Enron Directo 
Sociedad Limitada, High Court (Chancery). 
 35. Translation of the French first-instance judgment (on file with the author). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, Sept. 4, 2003, [2003] 
B.C.C. 984, 987 (Fr.) (Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SA). 
 40. Id. 
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the English judge had gone through a proper process of reasoning in or-
der to hold that the presumption based on the location of the registered 
office had been rebutted by the facts pointing to the center of main inter-
ests being in England. The French Court of Appeal thus recognized the 
opening of proceedings in England and voided the French opening.41 The 
French public prosecutor, who is a party to such proceedings in France, 
was still dissatisfied and appealed the matter to the French Supreme 
Court (Cour de Cassation), which eventually dismissed the appeal.42 
One point that troubled the French was that under French law the em-
ployees of a company have important rights to be consulted about the 
opening of insolvency proceedings.43 Such rights do not exist under Eng-
lish law, which under Article 4 of the EC Regulation governs the criteria 
for opening proceedings.44 
The German courts were, in principle, much more cooperative. In the 
case of one of the German subsidiaries, there was a mistake as to the 
facts and it was thought that proper notice had not been given to the rele-
vant director of the company.45 Once this factual mistake was cleared up, 
recognition was given in Germany.46 
The Daisytek case caused something of a storm of protest in Europe 
which has not entirely died down. While attending a conference organ-
ized by INSOL Europe in the City of Cork in Ireland, the distinguished 
Professor Paulus, a leading German authority in this area, denounced the 
British courts as “imperialists.” Subsequently, however, at the second-
annual German Insolvency Congress in Berlin, the author explained in 
his presence that the English courts were pragmatists rather than imperi-
alists, and peace has been declared sufficiently to enable us to write an 
Article together calling for various urgent reforms to the EC Regula-
tion.47 
The good practical sense of the approach in Enron Directo and Dai-
sytek has meant that it has been followed in other countries. In Hettlage 
                                                                                                                                  
 41. Id. at 992. 
 42. Cass. com., June 27, 2006, [2006] B.C.C. 841 (Fr.) (French Republic v. 
Klempka). 
 43. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, Sept. 4, 2003, [2003] 
B.C.C. 984 (Fr.) (Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SA). 
 44. Council Regulation 1346/2000, art. 4, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1. 
 45. The history is set out in the first instance court judgment of March 12, 2004 
(Amtsgericht Düsseldorf) (translation on file with author). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Gabriel Moss & Christoph Paulus, The European Insolvency Regulation—The 
Case for Urgent Reform, 19 INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 1 (2006). 
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AG (a.k.a. Hettlage Austria),48 the German insolvency court in Munich 
applied a similar approach in relation to an Austrian-registered company 
in a German group.49 In the Hungarian case of the Parmalat Group,50 a 
particular company (Mliekotej, a.k.a. Parmalat Slovakia) was incorpo-
rated in Slovakia, which has a particularly business-friendly approach in 
respect of, inter alia, taxes, but was run from Hungary.51 Main proceed-
ings were opened by the Hungarian local court.52 In France, after the 
French had reconciled themselves to the approach of “Perfidious Al-
bion,”53 they very efficiently adopted it themselves in the case of 
MPOTEC GmbH, a German-registered company run as part of a French 
group.54 It was only a matter of time before they got a chance to do it to 
the English themselves. This occurred as recently as August 2, 2006 in 
the case of Eurotunnel Finance Limited,55 an English-registered com-
pany which is part of the Eurotunnel group. That case is being appealed. 
Interestingly, whereas the English, German, and Hungarian courts had 
focused mainly on the need to fulfill the statutory criteria of Article 3 of 
the EC Regulation by having resort to “the head office functions” ap-
proach to rebut the presumption of place of incorporation, the French 
seemed quite happy to give as an additional rationalization, in their 
cases, the pragmatic usefulness of running insolvency proceedings from 
the same place from which the group itself had been run. There is no bet-
ter statement of English pragmatism than in the French judgments. For 
example, in the MPOTEC case, the relevant case law is summarized as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                                  
 48. Amtsgericht München [AG] May 4, 2004, ZIP 20/2004, 962 (F.R.G.) (unofficial 
translation on file with author). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Municipal Court of Fejer/Szekesfehervar (Hung.) (unreported; unofficial transla-
tion on file with author). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. A translation of the mid-nineteenth century French expression “la perfide Al-
bion,” referring to the French view that the British are treacherous in their dealings with 
foreigners. See “Albion,” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 54. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] 
Nanterre, Feb. 15, 2006 [2006] B.C.C. 681 (Fr.). Interestingly, this was a decision of the 
Tribunal de Commerce of Nanterre, whose district includes the area outside Paris where 
the corporate head office towers banned from the center of Paris, France, are located—in 
other words the location of many head office functions! 
 55. Tribunal de commerce Paris, Aug. 2, 2006 (Fr.) (unreported) (unofficial transla-
tion on file with the author). 
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The analysis of the case law of the various Member States shows that 
courts adopt a pragmatic approach tending to allow streamlining of 
strongly integrated groups of companies. 
In this respect, the centralisation of proceedings permits the avoidance 
of the partitioning effects linked to the opening of several main pro-
ceedings in different Member States. It is indeed desirable that the 
management of different companies continues thanks to a centralisation 
of different main proceedings under the supervision of just one court in 
order to allow the implementation of a global administration plan. 
This pragmatic approach preserves the legal personality of the subsidi-
ary which is not considered as a branch of the parent company within 
the meaning of Regulation 1346/2000. Above all, this approach allows 
the opening of secondary proceedings, independently of the location of 
the registered office, in order to better take into account of the interests 
of employees and local creditors. This interpretation was retained by 
the German and Austrian case law in the Daisytek . . . Automold, 
Hettlage and Rover cases and, more recently, by the judgment of De-
cember 15, 2005, by the Court of Appeal of Versailles.56 
V. THE “HEAD OFFICE FUNCTIONS” TEST IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE 
For technical reasons, which the author will not deal with in detail 
here, but which were explained in The EC Regulation on Insolvency Pro-
ceedings,57 a reference seeking guidance on questions of European law 
cannot be sought in respect of the EC Regulation except when one has 
reached the final appellate court in one’s own system. Note, however, 
that this is not like an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, since the proce-
dure involves not an appeal but rather the reference of particular issues of 
European law, designed to enable the national final appellate court to 
make its decision in the light of the rulings as to European law on those 
issues. Ultimately, getting the right answers depends on asking the right 
questions. 
In terms of getting such rulings, the Irish have a great advantage: they 
only have one level of appeal, which is from the High Court to the Su-
preme Court. 
The insolvency of the Parmalat Group in Italy has led to great deal of 
interesting legal work in the United States, the Caribbean, and Europe. 
One of the Parmalat subsidiaries was an Irish-registered company called 
Eurofood, registered in Ireland in order to take advantage of the favor-
                                                                                                                                  
 56. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] 
Nanterre, Feb. 15, 2006 [2006] BCC 681, 687–88 (Fr.) (MPOTEC GmbH). 
 57. MOSS ET AL., supra note 1, para. 2.34. 
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able tax climate in the Dublin docks. The entity itself had no employees 
and was run by Bank of America,58 a close business associate of Par-
malat before its insolvency. 
Although Eurofood had a board consisting of Irish and Italian direc-
tors, since Eurofood had no business other than the raising of money for 
the Parmalat Group it can be inferred that the steps that Eurofood took 
were under the ultimate direction of the Parmalat parent in Italy. In any 
event, Eurofood only carried out three transactions—two transactions 
raising money guaranteed by the Italian parent and one swap.59 Fearing 
that the Italians were (from Bank of America’s point of view) going to 
move the center of main interests to Italy, Bank of America swooped by 
filing a petition to wind up in Ireland and applying successfully for the 
appointment of a provisional liquidator in order to prevent the center of 
main interests’ moving.60 When the matter subsequently came before the 
Italian court in Parma, that court held that the appointment of a provi-
sional liquidator had not opened proceedings in Ireland and that the cen-
ter of main interests was in Italy.61 Accordingly, the court opened main 
proceedings in respect of the company.62 
However, when the winding-up petition was heard in Ireland, the Irish 
court held that the appointment of the provisional liquidator had opened 
a proceeding and, amongst other things, the Irish court also declined to 
recognize the Italian opening because it believed that the provisional liq-
uidator had not been fairly treated in the Italian proceedings.63 Subse-
quently, the opening of main proceedings in Ireland was appealed by the 
Italian administrator to the Irish Supreme Court.64 The Irish Supreme 
Court made it clear that they thought the Irish courts were correct, but 
nevertheless put a series of rather loaded questions to the European Court 
of Justice designed to elicit answers which would confirm the Irish 
courts’ approach.65 The Irish Supreme Court was not, generally speaking, 
disappointed. For present purposes, the author will only deal with the 
ruling in relation to “centre of main interests.” 
In such proceedings before the European Court of Justice, detailed 
written arguments are submitted and a brief oral argument takes place, 
                                                                                                                                  
 58. See Re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [2005] B.C.C. 999, 1003 (S.C.) (Ir.). 
 59. Id. at 1004. 
 60. Id. at 1005. 
 61. Id. at 1005–06. A translation of the judgment of the Italian court is on file with the 
author. 
 62. Re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [2005] B.C.C. 999, 1003 (S.C.) (Ir.). 
 63. Id. (citing Re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [2004] B.C.C. 383 (H. Ct.) (Ir.)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1013; see Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., Opinion of Mr. Advocate 
General Jacobs, 2006 E.C.R. I-3813. 
1016 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 32:3 
after which the Advocate General, who is part of the court, gives his 
opinion. This is then considered by the judges of the court. In most cases 
the opinion is accepted and the court itself gives a brief judgment. In a 
minority of cases the opinion is rejected and acquires the status of a mi-
nority opinion. In cases where the opinion is accepted, since the eventual 
judgment is usually much more concise, the opinion can be looked to for 
further reasoning. 
In the Eurofood case, the judgment of the court says nothing at all 
about the “head office functions” test.66 This is due to the form of the 
question, which gave the European Court of Justice the choice of locat-
ing the center of main interests either in the place of the registered office, 
being also the place described by Recital (13) of the Regulation as the 
center of main interests,67 or in the place where the parent, by virtue of 
its shareholding and its power to appoint directors, controls the policy of 
the subsidiary.68 Given that choice, the European Court of Justice obvi-
ously had to vote for the description of the center of main interests ap-
pearing in Recital (13). This, of course, said nothing whatsoever about 
situations where the registered office was in one place and the head-
office functions were conducted in another. 
In order to see what has been said in the European Court of Justice 
about the “head office functions” test, one therefore needs to refer to the 
Advocate General’s Opinion, which the court generally followed in the 
case: 
Dr Bondi and the Italian Government submit that if it is to be demon-
strated that the centre of main interests is somewhere other than the 
State where a company’s registered office is located, it consequently 
needs to be shown that the head office’ type of functions are performed 
elsewhere. The focus must be on the head office functions rather than 
simply on the location of the head office because a ‘head office’ can be 
just as nominal as a registered office if head office functions are not 
carried out there. In transnational business the registered office is often 
chosen for tax or regulatory reasons and has no real connection with the 
place where head office functions are actually carried out. That is par-
ticularly so in the case of groups of companies, where the head office 
functions for the subsidiary are often carried out at the place where the 
head office functions of the parent of the group are carried out. 
. . . I find those submissions sensible and convincing. They do not, 
however, seem to me very helpful in answering the question. They do 
                                                                                                                                  
 66. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., Judgment, 2006 E.C.R. I-3813. 
 67. Council Regulation 1346/2000, Recital (13), 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1. 
 68. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Jacobs, 
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not in particular demonstrate that a parent company’s control of the 
subsidiary’s policy determines that subsidiary’s ‘centre of main inter-
ests’ within the meaning of the Regulation.69 
Thus, one can see an express endorsement of the “head office func-
tions” approach to rebutting the place of registration as the center of 
main interests. Accordingly, all those in Europe who appear to have the 
impression that the European Court of Justice has somehow overturned 
or disapproved of the previous case law have a mistaken impression. 
Indeed, the MPOTEC case cited above was decided after the Advocate 
General’s Opinion had come out and with express reference to it,70 and 
the Eurotunnel case was decided after the European Court of Justice 
Judgment came out, although it does not expressly refer to it. Each of 
these two cases follows the pre-Eurofood line of cases, using the “head 
office functions” approach.71 
What the European Court of Justice Judgment does do is emphasize 
that the facts rebutting the presumption of registered office must be “ob-
jective and ascertainable by third parties.”72 There is nothing surprising 
or novel in that. 
VI. HOW TO AVOID SECONDARIES 
Even if one has succeeded in opening main proceedings for all the 
companies in a group in one location, the smooth process of rescue, re-
construction, or beneficial sale can be disrupted by the opening of a sec-
ondary proceeding which would then apply local law to local assets. This 
was the type of potential difficulty encountered in the European opera-
tions of the Collins and Aikman Group, another U.S.-led group. 
A good start was made by opening main proceedings for companies in 
a number of differently registered subsidiaries in England.73 However, 
the filing of secondary proceedings by local creditors would have dis-
rupted the process of trying to sell the group business by the U.K. admin-
istrators in charge of all the main proceedings. The legitimate concerns 
of local creditors were that if only main proceedings were opened the 
choice of law dictated by Article 4 of the EC Regulation would mean 
                                                                                                                                  
 69. Id., paras. 111–12. The author was lead Counsel for Dr. Bondi, the special admin-
istrator appointed by the Italian government. 
 70. Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] 
Nanterre, Feb. 15, 2006 [2006] B.C.C. 681 (Fr.) (MPOTEC GmbH). 
 71. Id. at 687; see Tribunal de commerce Paris, Aug. 2, 2006 (Fr.) (Eurotunnel) (un-
reported) (unofficial translation on file with the author). 
 72. Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., Judgment, 2006 E.C.R. I-3813, para. 34. 
 73. Re Collins & Aikman Corp. Group (Application for Administration Orders), 
[2005] EWHC (Ch) 1754, [2006] B.C.C. 606 (Eng.). 
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that local priorities would not apply.74 These included equitable subordi-
nation provisions in Germany and Spain, the application of which would 
have had a considerable beneficial effect for local trade creditors.75 
The administrators met with committees of local creditors and in order 
to prevent them from opening secondaries gave them assurances to the 
effect that local priorities would be respected.76 As a result, a very good 
sale of the group business (with some exceptions) without the opening of 
secondaries (again with some exceptions) took place, achieving a consid-
erably higher return than had been forecast.77 The remaining legal prob-
lem was the ability of the administrators to keep their promises, given 
that the mandatory terms of Article 4 of the EC Regulation required the 
application of English law and English law priorities. Fortunately for the 
administrators, we78 were able to find no less than three grounds, ac-
cepted by the judge, for justifying the giving of assurances and their ful-
fillment.79 
If sufficient flexibility can be found in other European laws where 
main proceedings are opened, Collins & Aikman will be an obvious 
model for the way to harmonize the need for centralization and simplic-
ity, on the one hand, and the respecting of local priorities, on the other. 
The indirect application of local priorities through the provisions of Eng-
lish statute and case law also neatly balances the charges of imperialism 
and demonstrates that the application of the “head office functions” test 
has in fact been a triumph of pragmatism. 
For the sake of completeness, it is important to mention that there are 
some limited situations in which the opening of secondary proceedings is 
either necessary or beneficial. Examples include situations where the 
local law is more helpful in terms of the transfer of employees to a pur-
chaser or where the application of local law is necessary to restrain en-
forcement of a security interest, since the enforcement of security inter-
ests in other Member States forms an exception from the general appli-
cability of the law of the main proceedings.80 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 74. Council Regulation 1346/2000, art. 4, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1. 
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